The original two-way continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution (CV QKD) protocols [S. Pirandola, S. Mancini, S. Lloyd, and S. L. Braunstein, Nature Physics 4, 726 (2008)] give the security against the collective attack on the condition of the tomography of the quantum channels. We propose a family of new two-way CV QKD protocols and prove their security against collective entangling cloner attacks without the tomography of the quantum channels. The simulation result indicates that the new protocols maintain the same advantage as the original two-way protocols whose tolerable excess noise surpasses that of the one-way CV-QKD protocol. We also show that all sub-protocols within the family have higher secret key rate and much longer transmission distance than the one-way CV-QKD protocol for the noisy channel.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution is well applied to cryptography due to its unconditional security based on quantum mechanics. 1 In particular, continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV QKD) has attracted much attention in recent years because it has potentially faster and more efficient detection and key rate than single-photon QKD. 2,3,4,5 One-way CV QKD allows the quantum state to pass through the channel only from the sender (Alice) to the receiver (Bob), which brings a limitation that the channel loss is no more than 3 dB in direct reconciliation. 6 Although the post-selection 7 or the reverse reconciliation 8,9 overcomes this drawback, the secret key rate is strongly affected by excess noise. 10 To enhance the tolerable excess noise, the two-way CV-QKD protocols are proposed to go beyond the 3 dB limit and meanwhile tolerate more excess noise than one-way protocols. 10, 3 The procedure of implementing the original two-way CV protocol is briefly introduced below. The entanglement-based (EB) scheme of a sub-protocol in the original two-way protocols, Het 2 protocol, is shown in Fig. 1 (a), and can be described as: 10,3
Step one. Bob initially prepares an EPR pair with variance V and keeps one mode B 1 while sending the other mode C 1 to Alice through the channel where Eve may perform her attack.
Step two. Alice encodes her information by applying a random phase-space displacement operator D(α) to her received mode A in and then sends the mode A out back to Bob through the channel. Note that α = (Q A + iP A )/2, and Q A or P A has a random Gaussian modulation with the variance of V − 1, respectively.
Step three. Bob measures both his original mode B 1 and received mode B 2 with heterodyne detection to get the variables x B1X and p B1P as well as x B2X and p B2P , respectively.
Step four. Alice and Bob implement the postprocessing including reconciliation and privacy amplification. 11 In this procedure, Bob needs to combine both outcomes from B 1 and B 2 to construct the optimal estimator to Alice's corresponding variables {Q A , P A }. After the steps above, Alice and Bob can share a string of identical key that Eve does not know.
However, to analyze the security under general collective attack, the original two-way protocols need to construct the hybrid protocol where Alice randomly switches between one-way (switch OFF, where Alice detects the incoming mode and sends a new state back to Bob) and two-way schemes (switch ON) for implementing the tomography of the quantum channels and for both parameter estimation and key distribution, 10,3 as shown in Fig.1 . This hybrid scheme increases the complexity in a real setup. Moreover, it is difficult to implement the tomography of quantum channels in a real experiment. In this paper, we modify the original two-way protocol by replacing the displacement operation and the ON-OFF switch with a passive operation on Alice's side, and give a feasible prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme, which pushes the two-way protocol to be easily applied in practice. Considering that Gaussian collective attack is optimal, we will prove the security of the new protocol under collective entangling cloner attacks which are a special case of general Gaussian collective attack thoroughly researched in Ref. 12, 13 . This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the statements of our new two-way CV-QKD protocol. In Sec. 3, we give a theoretical analysis of the security of the new two-way CV-QKD protocol against Gaussian collective attack by using the optimality of Gaussian collective attack. In Sec. 4, we investigate the numerical simulation of the secret key rate under collective entangling cloner attacks. Finally, in Sec. 5, we conclude our results and indicate some open questions.
A New Two-Way CV QKD Protocol
We modify the original two-way protocols by replacing the displacement operation and the ON-OFF switch with the passive operation on Alice's side. The EB scheme of Het 2 M protocol after modifying the Het 2 protocol is shown in Fig. 1 mode of another EPR pair (variance: V A ) with the received mode A in from Bob and sends the coupling mode A out back to Bob. She also measures the other mode A 1 of this EPR pair with heterodyne detection to get the variables {x A1X , p A1P } and randomly measures the position quadrature x or the momentum quadrature p of the coupling mode A 2 from the beam splitter with homodyne detection.
Step f our ′ . Alice and Bob implement the postprocessing including the reconciliation and privacy amplification. 11 In this procedure, the homodyne detection on the mode A 2 is used to estimate the channel's parameters and Bob uses x B = x B2X − kx B1X and p B = p B2P + kp B1P to construct the optimal estimator to Alice's corresponding variables {x A1X , p A1P }, where k is the channel's total transmittance which is obtained by reconciliation. The other steps of Het 2 M are the same as those of Het 2 . In Fig. 1(b) , Alice's beam splitter T A couples the two uncorrelated states respectively from Alice and Bob. The action of the beam splitter T A is equivalent to a unitary transformation. One output mode A 2 of this beam splitter is kept and measured on Alice's side and the other mode A out is sent to Bob though the channel. The effects of system parameters and environment parameters on entanglement are discussed in detail in Ref. 14. Here the two channels affect the entanglement degrees of those three pairs of states: B 1 and A 2 , B 1 and B 2 , and A 1 and B 2 . The effect on the channels can be ascribed to the action of Eve. Considering one-mode Gaussian attack, the two channels can be described as two independent GaussianEntangling-Cloner attacks. 10 It is necessary to estimate the channel's parameters by the measurement values of Alice and Bob in security analysis.
The PM scheme of Het 2 M protocol is shown in Fig. 1(c) , which is equivalent to the EB scheme in Fig. 1(b) . 8 In Fig 1(c) , with using the random numbers m and n, Bob randomly modulates the amplitude (A) and the phase (φ) of the coherent state from his laser source (LS1), and then sends the state to Alice. Alice's laser source (LS2) is coherent with Bob's LS1 by phaselock and time synchronization techniques. 15 Similar to Bob's modulation, Alice uses two other random numbers r and s to encode information. After that, the beam splitter (transmittance: T A ) couples Alice's signal with the signal from Bob's side, and outputs one mode back to Bob and another mode measured with homodyne detection. At last, the returned mode is measured with heterodyne detection on Bob's side. Note that the local oscillator and the switch which randomly controls the homodyne detection to detect the x or p quadrature are omitted for concision in Fig. 1 .
In addition, the other original 10 (e.g., Hom 2 ) can be modified to new protocol (e.g., Hom 
A Theoretical Analysis of the Security of the New Two-Way Protocol
We consider the EB scheme of Het 2 M protocol in reverse reconciliation. The secret key rate is 16,17
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I BA is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, I BE is the mutual information between Eve and Bob. According to step f our
V A M |B are Alice's variance and conditional variance on Bob, respectively. 9 I BA can be obtained with Alice's and Bob's data. As far as I BE is concerned, according to Holevo bound, 18 we get 
T , where x B4 , p B4 , x B3 and p B3 are the x and p quadratures of the modes B 3 and B 4 and Γ k is a continuous-variable C-NOT gate 19,20,21
Considering the assumption that Eve has no access to the interior of Bob, 1 Eve obtains the information only from Bob's input and output. Because the unitary transformation Γ k doesn't change the von Neumann entropy of the system 20 B 2X B 1X B 2P B 1P A 2 A 1X A 1P E and the variables x B and p B are same to both Figs. 1(b) and 2, Eve's von Neumann entropy and conditional von Neumann entropy on Bob in Fig. 2 are equivalent to those in Fig. 1(b) . A detailed proof can be seen in Appendix A. In addition, taking into account that I BA is the same for both systems, the secret key rate is same to both Figs First, we show that the Gaussian attack is optimal to the new protocol. According to the step two ′ and step three of the protocol Het 2 M , Alice and Bob measure the mode A 2 with homodyne detection and measure the modes A 1 , B 1 and B 2 with heterodyne detection. This is equivalent to the scheme that Alice and Bob measure the mode A 1 with heterodyne detection and measure the modes A 2 , B 3 , B 4 , B 5 and B 6 with homodyne detection in Fig. 2 , i.e., Alice and Bob measure all modes except Eve's modes. In Fig. 2 , ρ E , ρ B and ρ A denote the states of Eve, the modes B 4 B 6 and the modes A 2 A 1X A 1P B 3 B 5 , respectively. It is easily seen that ψ ABE is a pure state and ρ AB is the purification of ρ E . Because Alice and Bob's heterodyne or homodyne detection on their modes does not mix the x and p quadratures and Alice and Bob use the second-order moments of the quadratures to calculate the secret key rate bound, the new protocol can satisfy the requirement of the optimality of Gaussian collective attack. 20 Thus, when the corresponding covariance matrix Γ AB of ρ AB is known and fixed for Alice and Bob, the Gaussian attack is optimal. 22,23,24,25 Therefore, Eve's accessible information can be bounded by only considering Eve's Gaussian collective attack. In the following part, I BE is calculated using some ideas proposed in Ref. 26 .
Second, to calculate S(E), one needs to know S(ρ AB ) because ψ ABE is a pure state and S(E) = S(ρ AB ). The entropy S(ρ AB ) of the Gaussian state ρ AB is calculated according to its corresponding covariance matrix Γ AB . Note that
where I 3 is a 6×6 identity matrix and Γ B2X B1X B1P B2P A2A1X A1P is the corresponding covariance matrix of the state
in which I is a 2 × 2 identity matrix. In Eq. (5), the diagonal elements correspond to the variances of x and p quadratures of the modes
, and the nondiagonal elements correspond to the covariances between modes, e.g., C 2 = diag( x B2X x A2 , p B2X p A2 ), where x B2X , p B2X , x A2 and p A2 are the x and p quadratures of the modes B 2X and A 2 , respectively. In experiment, the covariance matrix Eq. (5) Eve's entropy 27
where
and 
where Γ B3B5A2A1X A1P , γ B4 and γ B6 are the corresponding reduced matrixes of state B 3 B 5 A 2 A 1X A 1P , B 4 and B 6 in Γ AB , respectively, C B4 and C B6 are their correlation matrixes, X x = diag(1, 0), X p = diag(0, 1) and M P denotes the inverse on the range. Similar to Eq. (6), we obtain
where λ (6) and (9) into Eq. (1), the secret key rate is obtained
In experiment, Alice and Bob can calculate every element of Eq. (5) (4) and (8) . Therefore, according to Eq. (10), Eve's accessible information under Gaussian collective attacks is bounded and the secret key rate is obtained. Similarly, the security of other sub-protocols of the new two-way CV QKD can be analyzed.
In theory, for the security analysis, we consider collective entangling cloner attacks. Collective entangling cloner attacks are a specific case of collective Gaussian attacks where the communication channel is linear with transmittance T (0 < T < 1) and thermal noise. 12,13 The assumption of linear channel is often used since the linear channel is common in real experiment and easy to be numerically simulated.
To get the elements of Eq. (5) for numerical simulation, we assume that the two channels are linear with the transmittances T 1 and T 2 and the noises referred to the input χ 1 = ε 1 + (1 − T 1 )/T 1 and χ 2 = ε 2 + (1 − T 2 )/T 2 , respectively, where ε 1 and ε 2 are the channel excess noises referred to the input. We can obtain
and
Substituting above equations into Eq. (10), the secret key rate of Het 2 M protocol against collective entangling cloner attacks can be obtained. Similarly, the secret key rate of the other sub-protocols of the new two-way CV QKD can be also obtained (seen in Appendix D).
Numerical Simulation and Discussion on Collective Entangling
Cloner Attacks
For simplicity in numerical simulation, we only consider for T 1 = T 2 and χ 1 = χ 2 (or ε 1 = ε 2 = ε). The tolerable excess noise ε can be obtained when the secret key rate K R is zero. When ε, β, T A , V and V A are known, the elements of Γ B2X B2P B1X B1P A2A1X A1P are obtained from Eq. (11) . Assuming that the typical fiber channel loss is 0.2 dB/km, with using Eq. (10), we numerically simulate ε and K R as the functions of the transmission distance by MATLAB. For comparison, the original Het 2 protocol, 10 the heterodyne protocol (Het) and the homodyne protocol (Hom) of one-way CV-QKD protocol 5,6 are also numerically simulated in Figs.  3(a) and (b) , respectively. Fig. 3(a) shows the tolerable excess noise as a function of the transmission distance for Het 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we propose a family of new two-way CV-QKD protocols by replacing the displacement operation of the original two-way CV-QKD protocols with the passive operation on Alice's side. By using the optimality of Gaussian attack and the purification of the system, Eve's accessible information is bounded by the measurement values of Alice and Bob. The security of the new two-way CV-QKD protocols against collective entangling cloner attacks is proved without randomly switching between one-way and two-way schemes for the quantum-channel tomography. Thus the PM scheme of our new protocol can be applied more practically. The simulation result indicates that the tolerable excess noise in the new protocols approaches the original ones when T A is close to 1. Even if T A and V A have real experimental values, the new two-way CV-QKD protocols still outperform the one-way protocols in secret key rate and transmission distance. Especially, the new sub-protocol Hom-Het M allows the distribution of secret keys over much longer distance than the one-way protocols. However, some open questions about the security of the new two-way CV-QKD protocols still remain. In our proof, we have not analyzed the effects of the finite size, 35,36,37 the source noise 38,39,40,41 and the detection noise 16,29 on the security. Especially, it is worthwhile to further investigate the method to enhance the tolerable excess noise of CV QKD by adding proper noise on the side of the sender or the receiver. 31,32,33,34,40 These problems will be researched in our future work. Appendix A. The Equivalence of Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 2 
on Eve's Accessible Information
In Fig. 1(b) , Bob calculates two variables x B = x B2X − kx B1X and p B = p B2P + kp B1P after measuring B 1X , B 2X , B 1P and B 2P . We name it as measureand-calculate (MC) process. In Fig. 2 , Bob measures the mode B 4 (B 6 ) to get the variable x B4 = x B (p B6 = p B ) after using two Γ k on the modes B 1X , B 2X , B 1P and B 2P . We name it as transform-and-measure (TM) process. In the following, we prove that the two processes are equivalent for Eve's entropy S(E) as well as con- 
F B ρ AoBoE F B dx 1 dx 2 dp 1 dp 2 , (A.1)
F B indicates the measurement process that obtains the corresponding eigenvalues x 1 , x 2 , p 1 and p 2 of B 1X , B 2X , B 1P and B 2P . In order to get x B = x 2 − kx 1 and p B = p 2 + kp 1 , we do the parameter transformation by replacing x 2 and p 2 with x 2 = x B + kx 1 and p 2 = p B − kp 1 , respectively. For the conditional state, we fix x B and p B , and denote:
When x B and p B are known, Eve's state is
(A.5) 
AoB3B5E |x 3 , p 5 B3B5 dx 3 dp 5
Since Eq. (A.7) is the same as Eq. (A.5) and P (x B , p B ) is proportion to tr AoE ∞ −∞ Bo +−| ρ AoBoE |+− Bo dx 1 dp 1 , S(E|x B , p B ) is identical in MC process and TM process. The cases in the other new sub-protocols can be proved in the same way.
In Fig. 2 , because the state B 2 B 1 A 2 A 1 E is also a pure state, S(E) = S(B 2 B 1 A 2 A 1 ). Similarly, in Fig. 1(b) , S(E) = S(B 2 B 1 A 2 A 1 ). Because the modes B 2 B 1 A 2 A 1 are same to Figs. 1(b) and 2, S(E) is same. Therefore, I BE is same to Figs. 1(b) and 2. Appendix B. The Calculation of Eq. (5) In Fig. 2 , the corresponding covariance matrixes of EPR pairs of Alice and Bob are
The two modes B 1 and A 1 are uncorrelated. The mode C 1 is changed into the mode A in through the channel. Alice couples one mode of her EPR pair with the mode A in by the beam splitter T A . The action of the beam splitter T A is equivalent to a 
where the diagonal elements correspond to the variances of x and p quadratures of the modes B 2 , B 1 , A 2 and A 1 in turn, and the nondiagonal elements correspond to the covariances between modes. Note that the covariance between the modes
, which is irrelevant to the channels since the mode A 1 is only controlled by Alice and its values are random.
In the heterodyne detection, a vacuum state is introduced by the beam splitter. The corresponding covariance matrix of the modes B 2 B 1 A 2 A 1 and the three vacuum states C 01 , C 02 and C 03 is
By the unitary transformations of the three beam splitters, the modes
T , where
Therefore, Eq. (5) is obtained, in which
Every element of Eq. (5) can be obtained by the measurement values in experiment. For example, in the heterodyne detection on the mode B 2 , the x quadrature value x B2X of the mode B 2X and the p quadrature value p B2P of the mode B 2P are obtained. There are the following relations
where x B2 , p B2 , x 0 and p 0 are the x and p quadratures of the mode B 2 and the vacuum state, respectively, p B2X is the p quadrature of the mode B 2X and x B2P is the x quadrature of the mode B 2P . Then, we get
Therefore, the variances of p and x quadratures of the modes B 2X and B 2P can be calculated according to the measurement values x B2X and p B2P Similarly, the covariances between modes can be calculated. For example,
where x A2 and p A2 are the measurement values of x and p quadratures of the mode A 2 which are obtained by randomly measuring the x and p quadratures of the mode A 2 .
where Θ = 2 
in Hom-Het M protocol, 8) and in Het-Hom M protocol,
According to Eq. (1), the secret key rate of above sub-protocols can be obtained.
